A rant from an IT Manager about W32.Blaster.Worm
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Ok, there's been a few people who don't know better talking about how everyone should have been patched for MSBlaster already, and that all admins who haven't patched are morons.
This is a pretty easy statement to make when you are responsible for 1-10 machines, and patching pretty much means hitting windows update.
However, life isn't that simple for everyone. In addition to my developer hat, I also have the (mis?)-fortune of being the IT manager for my company's site of ~200 nodes, with about a dozen production servers and a similar number of dev & qa servers. We are part of a bigger, global enterprise network consisting of about 60,000 nodes.
Let me say that again.
60,000 nodes.
My site experienced no disruption by W32.Blaster.Worm, because as IT Manager, I aggressively patched our production servers 3 weeks ago, followed by an equally aggressive client patch plan. It took two entire weeks to plan, test, and completely deploy the RPC patch across our relatively small site. In fact, we are still playing 'whack a mole' as developers and dial in users continue to bring up un-patched systems in our environments.
I've got a pretty big advantage that many IT managers don't these days. I have a generous IT budget that allows me to approve large amounts of overtime and software expenditures. I still spent many, many hours of overtime making certain that we were protected. End result? A single computer was infected, ironically just as the user was hitting http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com from behind our firewall.
Not all of our enterprise network was so lucky. One of our sites suffered from several hundred infections. Our network teams quickly deployed rules at our intra-site router boundaries to prevent traffic flowing on RPC ports, at the cost of breaking several enterprise applications, including intra site and external email. Basically, our Exchange Servers couldn't talk to each other.
Next time you are preaching about admins not deploying the patch of the day, try planning a deployment for 60,000 machines, performing enough testing to ensure that _no_ line of business applications are broken by the patch. I guarantee that you'll have greater respect for hard working sysadmins.
Also feel free if you've always written code that is free of buffer overflow or other equally critical security bugs. Remember that it was a developer that wrote the RPC code that is at the root cause of this security issue.
This doesn't even mentioned the other part of our business that is governed by FDA regulations, where it can actually become a legal offense to implement an IT change without rigorous testing and documentation. Three weeks would be lightning fast to deploy a patch in such an environment. To deploy an un-tested patch, I would actually be risking breaking the law. (Note for my best friend, the potential FDA inspector: All CSV procedure were followed, thank you.)
(Let it be noted here that all of the above rant is my personal opinion, and in no way reflects the opinions of my employer).
</RANT>